Thirteen years of continuous combat operations have enabled the US Military and its coalition partners to make a number of major advances in casualty care. The coalition nations have developed a superb combat trauma system and achieved unprecedented casualty survival rates. There remains, however, a need to accelerate the translation of new battlefield trauma care information, training, and equipment to units and individuals deploying in support of combat operations. In addition, the US Military needs to ensure that these advances are sustained during peace intervals and that we continue to build upon our successes as we prepare for future conflicts. This article contains recommendations designed to accomplish those goals. For the proposed actions to benefit all branches of our armed services, the direction will need to come from the Office of the Secretary of Defense in partnership with the Joint Staff. Effective translation of military advances in prehospital trauma care may also increase survival for law enforcement officers wounded in the line of duty and for civilian victims of Active Shooter or terrorist-related mass-casualty incidents. (J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2015;79: 321Y326.
D ebakey 1 observed that, ''Had certain problems in World War I been recognized and addressed, their repetition in World War II could have been avoided. The end of hostilities brings such a sense of relief that we are inclined to want to put the experience behind us.'' This observation proved true in the aftermath of World War II as well. We knew that the tourniquets fielded and used by US forces in World War II were largely ineffective at stopping arterial blood flow. 2 We knew that morphine as fielded and used by US forces in that war was slow to relieve pain and was reported to cause life-threatening overdoses. 3 We knew the benefits of hypotensive resuscitation in resuscitating casualties in shock from noncompressible hemorrhage 4 and freeze-dried plasma. 5, 6 None of these opportunities to improve combat casualty care had, however, been effectively translated to modern combat medicine at the onset of the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Turning lessons learned in combat casualty care into lives saved in future conflicts requires definitive action and strong leadership to ensure that these lessons are incorporated into improved best-practice trauma care guidelines. Since advances in military trauma care often result in a survival benefit for trauma victims in the civilian sector as well, 7, 8 a dual benefit may be realized by improving the implementation and preservation of combat casualty care lessons learned.
Combat Casualty Care, 2001
The US Military had not effectively sustained many of the lessons learned from past conflicts and went to war in Afghanistan without wide availability of tourniquets, without modern battlefield analgesics, without prehospital plasma, and without trauma care guidelines designed specifically for use on the battlefield. Hemostatic dressings had not yet been developed and fielded. There was no military deployed trauma system, no Department of Defense trauma registry (DoDTR), no weekly worldwide trauma teleconferences to review treatments and outcomes for all casualties occurring in the preceding week, and no Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (CoTCCC).
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Combat Casualty Care, 2015
All of these challenges were met during the 13 years of conflict that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001 . This prolonged interval of continuous combat operations allowed the US Military and its coalition partners to make major advances in trauma care and to achieve unprecedented casualty survival rates. 13 The standards of care have been redefined in prehospital hemorrhage control, transfusion medicine, and care during casualty transport. 11 The United States and its coalition partner nations have now developed a Joint Trauma System (JTS) that works closely with the combat theater medical leadership to establish and ensure standards for battlefield, evacuation, and in-hospital trauma care.
11 Forty-five evidencebased clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are presently used on our evacuation platforms and in our deployed military hospitals to preserve trauma care lessons learned.
14 Some of these advances have transitioned rapidly to the civilian sector. The military's damage-control resuscitation strategy, for example, which is designed to promote hemostasis as well as to restore intravascular volume and tissue perfusion in casualties being resuscitated from hemorrhagic shock, 15 has been shown to improve casualty survival 16 and is now used in more than 70% of US civilian trauma centers. 17 In the area of prehospital care for combat casualties, the lack of high-quality evidence, organizational and doctrinal complexities, and divided responsibilities in the military structure have historically combined to make improvements in this phase of care difficult to achieve. Maughon 18 observed in 1970 that few real advances in battlefield trauma care had been made in the last 100 years. Prehospital combat casualty care has now been transformed by the concepts of Tactical Combat Casualty Care  (TCCC). 12 TCCC is the product of a joint US Special Operations Command and Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences biomedical research effort. The TCCC guidelines are evidence-based trauma care guidelines designed specifically for use on the battlefield. They are reviewed and updated frequently by the CoTCCC, which is the prehospital arm of the JTS. The JTS is a directorate within the US Army Institute of Surgical Research (a component command of the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command). 12 The TCCC guidelines include tourniquets, hemostatic dressings, new prehospital fluid resuscitation and analgesic strategies, and many other advances over prehospital care as it was practiced in 2001. 12 The use of TCCC-recommended interventions has been shown to improve outcomes for combat casualties 19Y24 and to be well-suited for use on the battlefield. 20 They have been adopted widely throughout the US Military and by our coalition partner nations.
22Y31 Although conducting well-designed prospective randomized studies on the impact of specific interventions on casualty outcomes in the inherent chaos of the tactical combat environment is not feasible, this challenge can largely be overcome by making optimal use of the available evidence and a clear understanding of the differences between civilian prehospital trauma care and care as it is provided on the battlefield 32, 33 (Table 1) .
Improving Performance in Combat Casualty Care
The JTS now monitors outcomes in US and coalition casualties to identify opportunities to improve combat casualty care. Advances throughout the continuum of care produced a steady decline in the case-fatality rate among US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan despite progressively increasing injury severity. 35 Another important metric in trauma care is fatalities that occur in casualties whose injuries were potentially survivable. 36 Eastridge et al. 10 reviewed all 4,596 US combat fatalities during a 10-year period in the recent conflicts. This The uses as described here for fentanyl lozenges, tranexamic acid, moxifloxacin, and ertapenem are off-label, but all four medications are FDA-approved medications. study found that 24% of our prehospital combat fatalities succumbed to wounds that were potentially survivable. The study of Eastridge et al. determined the survivability of wounds based on a predefined set of anatomic injuries that were considered nonsurvivable and labeled all other injuries as potentially survivable. Tactical information relating to these fatalities such as prolonged engagements with hostile forces or other unavoidable delays in evacuation to medical treatment facilities with an emergency surgery capability was not available to the investigators and was therefore not considered. Injury survivability was determined based on anatomic autopsy findings alone. Many of these fatalities might have been avoided if lifesaving surgery had been immediately available for all seriously injured casualties, but the exigencies of combat usually preclude the availability of immediate surgical care. Noncompressible hemorrhage, which presently can only be controlled with surgery, was the cause of death in 67% of the potentially preventable fatalities identified in the study of Eastridge et al. It should be noted that this study spans a decade throughout which many advances in trauma care such as extremity and junctional tourniquets, hemostatic dressings, and damage-control resuscitation were introduced into use by US and coalition forces. The incidence of death from some types of injuries was therefore progressively reduced as the wars continued. The impact of increasing tourniquet use alone was striking. Death from extremity hemorrhage in US casualties (as a percentage of the 982 combat fatalities reviewed) was 7.8% in the period 2003 through 2006, 37 a period during which many US units did not use extremity tourniquets. Extremity tourniquets began to be more widely used by the military in 2005, and by the end of 2010, the incidence of potentially preventable death from extremity hemorrhage had been reduced to 2.6%, a decrease of 66%. 10, 37 While opportunities to improve in deployed hospitalbased care have been documented by Martin et al., 38 the study of Eastridge et al. found that the large majority of combat fatalities (87%) occur in the prehospital environment. This finding highlights the need to focus on battlefield trauma care in the effort to further improve casualty survival. 10 As West et al. 36 pointed out three decades ago, preventable deaths in trauma patients should not be regarded as acts of God and accepted as inevitable; they should rather be approached with careful, systematic review of the care provided and implementation of corrective action where needed.
The 75th Ranger Regiment has demonstrated that an unprecedented decrease in potentially preventable deaths can be achieved through command ownership and responsibility for the unit's prehospital trauma care program and by training all unit personnelVnonmedical combatants and medicsVto perform TCCC. 24 There were 196 casualties (7.4% of fatalities) who died of exsanguination from extremity wounds in the prehospital phase of care in the Maughon study 18 and 77 deaths from this cause (7.8%) in the study of Kelly et al. 37 As a result of the establishment of the TCCC-based Ranger First Responder program, with its strong emphasis on control of external hemorrhage, before the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, there were no Ranger deaths from extremity hemorrhage in the 8.5 years of conflict included in this study. 24 TCCC was implemented in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1999. The article by Savage et al. 22 noted that, despite the increasing severity of the injuries sustained by Canadian Forces (CF) in the recent conflicts, ''I the CF experienced the highest casualty survival rate in history. Though this success is multifactorial, the determination and resolve of CF leadership to develop and deliver comprehensive, multileveled TCCC packages to soldiers and medics is a significant reason for that and has unquestionably saved the lives of Canadian, Coalition and Afghan Security Forces.'' Performance improvement methodology now used by the JTS includes weekly worldwide trauma teleconferences, focused reviews of information contained in the DoDTR to determine the impact of specific interventions on casualty outcomes, 39 and monthly conferences with the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System to discuss the causes of death in combat fatalities and how they might have been prevented. Opportunities to improve in prehospital care are addressed by ongoing updates to the TCCC guidelines; 34 similar opportunities for in-hospital and en route care are addressed by periodic changes to the JTS CPGs. 14 The ongoing updates to the JTS CPGs and the TCCC guidelines also help to identify evidence gaps in the trauma care literature and highlight the need for research projects designed to address these gaps. A prioritized list of proposed battlefield trauma care research efforts is currently being addressed by the JTS in a separate publication.
Challenges to Effecting Change in Battlefield Trauma Care
In 2012 and 2013, two assessments of prehospital care in Afghanistan were conducted by the JTS at the request of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM). These assessments found that TCCC concepts, medications, and equipment had been implemented unevenly and incompletely across the battle space. 40, 41 The failure to effectively implement these bestpractice battlefield trauma care guidelines occurred despite the endorsements by senior combat commanders and medical leaders in the US Military noted previously. These findings emphasize the point made by Mabry and DeLorenzo 42 that divided and overlapping responsibilities and authorities create challenges to optimizing trauma care across an enterprise as large and complex as the DoD. Just as the United States has hundreds of trauma centers and thousands of autonomous prehospital care systems, which can potentially slow the transition of advances in military prehospital trauma care into use in the civilian sector, the US Military has four armed services, six Geographic Combatant Commands, the US Special Operations Command and the US Transportation Command, all of which play a role in the care of combat casualties. Each of these organizations is authorized to operate autonomously with respect to combat casualty care unless directives are issued at the highest level of the military chain of command, which is the Secretary of Defense (SecDef ) acting on the advice of his or her chief medical advisor, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. Lacking direction in the form of SecDef rule and Joint Staff doctrine, there is no assurance that advances in trauma care will be implemented consistently throughout the various components of the US Military. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates used his authority as the senior leader in the DoD to great effect in 2009, when he mandated a 60-minute maximum evacuation time in Afghanistan. 43 Because of his position as SecDef, Secretary Gates' directive was implemented quickly throughout all US forces in Afghanistan. An analysis of JTS data to determine the resulting impact on casualty survival is currently pending.
Based on recommendations of the Defense Health Board (the senior external advisory body to the DoD on medical issues) and the JTS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Service Surgeons General have all endorsed and promulgated TCCC concepts for battlefield trauma care, 23, 27, 28, 44, 45 but ensuring that combat units are trained to respond properly to combat casualty scenarios is the responsibility of combat unit commanders. Combat commanders typically act on the advice of their unit surgeons, but most military physicians have limited training in administering a prehospital trauma care system, and many have little or no knowledge of TCCC concepts. 40 It is clearly not optimal to have physicians who have not been trained in TCCC supervising corpsmen, medics, and pararescuemen who have had this training.
The analyses performed by the two DoD survey teams described earlier also found that there may be prolonged delays in translating newly recommended trauma care techniques and technologies to combat units. 40, 41 There is an urgent need to accelerate the implementation of advances in trauma care in deployed and deploying military units. Timely updates in newly recommended training, medications, and equipment are required if the US Military is to be successful in optimizing outcomes for our country's combat casualties through ongoing medical research and performance improvement efforts. Identifying opportunities to improve in prehospital trauma care, acting rapidly on these opportunities, and documenting the success of these innovations may also be of great benefit to civilian law enforcement officers and to victims of Active Shooter incidents, terrorist bombings, and victims of other types of noncombat trauma. 33, 46, 47 The need for an increased focus on tourniquet use in prehospital trauma care, as pioneered by TCCC, has been recognized as one of the lessons learned from the Boston Marathon bombing. 48, 49 Preserving the Advances in Combat Casualty Care
In light of the discussion earlier, how can we assure that the US Military will effectively capture the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq and use them to save lives in the next war? As previously noted, lessons learned in previous wars have often been lost. There is at present no assurance that the casualty care lessons learned from our most recent conflicts will be translated into sustained improvements in care. We need to be resolute in capturing not just the clinical advances in trauma care that have been made in these wars but in preserving the process and infrastructure changes that were instrumental in effecting these clinical advances. The following proposed actions would codify the DoD's newly developed system for the production and implementation of ongoing, evidence-based improvements in combat casualty care: ongoing, even in peacetime, for all medical department personnel who may be entrusted with the lives of our country's wounded in the next armed conflict. This training, coupled with strong partnerships with civilian trauma centers to ensure sustainment of essential trauma skills, will ensure that our military's combat trauma care capability does not languish in times of peace. Military medicine has progressively improved combat casualty care throughout the last 13 years of war. The US Military, in concert with its coalition partners, has now established a proven combat trauma system that has achieved the best casualty outcomes in the history of modern warfare. It is now imperative that we sustain those advances and build upon our successes in preparation for future conflicts. Knowing the right things to do in combat casualty care will not result in lives saved unless we act on this knowledge. For the actions proposed earlier to benefit the US Military as a whole, the direction will need to come from the Office of the Secretary of Defense in partnership with the Joint Staff. As a recent Associated Press article on combat trauma care noted, ''The currency of change in trauma medicine remains the blood of Soldiers.'' 50 Let us not re-pay this price again.
